Venezuela’s military enigma

https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/venezuela/039-venezuelas-military-enigma

Venezuela’s best shot at a peaceful post-Maduro future is to ensure that the armed forces have a stake and a say in the shape of a transition sooner rather than later.

The most recent effort to sever the military’s attachment to Maduro took place on 30 April, when Guaidó and his mentor Leopoldo López, whom state security police sprung from house arrest for the occasion, led an abortive civic and military uprising in Caracas. Only a small number of low-ranking soldiers, along with one more significant figure, Manuel Ricardo Cristopher Figuera, who was then head of the intelligence service SEBIN, answered Guaidó’s call to rebel. According to Cristopher, now in U.S. exile, armed forces chief General Vladimir Padrino López knew of the plot, though whether he approved it is unknown.¹

Interesting source: For an overview of the armed forces’ role in the years of chavismo, see Francine Jácome, “Los militares en la política y la economía de Venezuela”, Nueva Sociedad, vol. 274 (March-April 2018).

The top brass now controls swathes of the economy, occupies senior political and administrative positions, and oversees the country’s internal security (see Sections III and IV below).

Public letter to Guaido from Machado y Ledezma in June 2019: “You, Mr. President, have insisted on repeating that, in the face of the regime, all options are on the table. In reality, there is only one and only one real option on the table. That option is force, understood as the appropriate combination of the institutional strength of the National Assembly, its Interim Presidency and the legitimate TSJ, with the strength of the organised mobilisation of Venezuelans and the strength of a loyal international coalition, cooperating with us in the task of ousting the ruling narco-state, liberating Venezuela and rebuilding the Republic. We ask you to assume this reality”.

Stabilising the country during and after a transition will require the demobilisation of numerous heavily armed outfits, including pro-government colectivos, Colombian guerrillas from the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissidents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), as well as powerful home-grown criminal organisations known as sindicatos.

Official data about the FANB are scarce, and when available, usually consist of estimates rather than precise figures. According to the Defence Ministry, the armed forces comprise between 95,000 and 150,000 active professional members. When reservists are included, according to the same source, the number of combat troops rises to 235,000. Other estimates from specialised observers put the total size of the armed forces at 128,000.

In addition to the army, navy, air force and National Guard, whose roles include internal security and border control, there is also a National Militia, a volunteer body committed to defence of the “revolution”. The militia is mainly employed in welfare programs, including the production and distribution of subsidised food. According to the government, the militia had 1.6 million members at the end of 2018. One military analyst, however, doubted that “more than 10 per cent of them have any serious military training”. Maduro has repeatedly said he expects each member of the militia to be armed, though there is little evidence this has occurred so far. He recently announced the incorporation of an estimated 30,000 milicianos into the regular forces, a decision that reportedly provoked indignation among military officers.

As the militia’s role suggests, Venezuela’s armed forces in the chavista era fulfil functions that go beyond the customary tasks of defending national territory and sovereignty, and even stretch their constitutional role of “active participation in national development” (Article 328). The armed forces’ purpose and identity have in fact grown inseparable from those of the “Bolivarian revolution” itself.

during his 2007 feud with former defence minister and one-time ally Raúl Isaías Baduel, but Chávez emerged victorious from both battles (Baduel has been imprisoned almost continuously since 2009)

Maduro, a civilian with neither his predecessor’s magnetism nor his seemingly limitless financial resources, has had to resort to giving the military ever greater power and autonomy, while at the same time demanding that senior officers display allegiance to chavismo and to himself. His inner circles are heavily drawn from the military: seven of the twenty chavista state governors come from the armed forces, and on average 20 to 30 per cent of his cabinet ministers have been men and women in uniform.

indications that much of the new military hardware is barely operational. But defence spending is only a slice of the military’s share of the country’s economy. Between 2013 and 2017, Venezuela established an estimated fourteen military firms in twenty economic sectors, including agriculture, mining, oil, construction, banking, tourism, insurance and the media. Officers occupy senior positions in these and other state-run businesses. The Venezuelan chapter of the international civil society organisation Transparency International, reported that in 2017 officers headed at least 60 of the 576 state-run companies, including the oil giant PDVSA, whose chairman is General Manuel Quevedo of the National Guard.

Officers run key ports and, in some parts of the country, operate “special economic military zones” free from public scrutiny. Since 2016, the Defence Ministry has overseen the Gran Misión Abastecimiento Soberano (Big Sovereign Supply Mission), a government program for production and countrywide distribution of food, medicines and other staples. Together with the Food Ministry, headed by generals throughout Maduro’s presidency, this “mission” is responsible for the CLAP program that provides subsidised food parcels to six million families. Venezuelan and international media have reported systemic corruption in the CLAP program, as well as its abuse in the name of social control.

The military has also been active in the mining industry since 2016. In that year, the Maduro government established the Orinoco Mining Arc in southern Venezuela, generating a gold rush and a boom in extraction of other minerals (eg, diamonds and coltan) that have brought waves of violence and environmental damage to the region. It has declared the Arc a “military economic zone”, giving the armed forces control not only over security in and around the mines but also over mineral extraction itself through a military-run company, CAMIMPEG.

Padrino López stays on as defence minister, while Admiral Remigio Ceballos continues to serve as operational commander of the armed forces; both are regarded as close to Maduro. But the post of commander of the armed forces, effectively the third most important job in the armed forces, is now held by General Alexis Rodríguez Cabello, a close ally of the government’s second most powerful figure, Diosdado Cabello. Maduro replicated this balancing act in appointments lower down the hierarchy, with most appointees associated with the president’s faction while a significant minority are linked to Cabello.

A low-ranking officer who recently resigned explained that middle-ranking officers “fight tooth and nail” to be appointed to administrative positions that offer access to resources, whereas positions devoted to troop command and training arouse far less interest. Corruption controls do not exist inside the armed forces, she said, and the opportunity to make illicit earnings depends on connections and political influence.

Officers nowadays understand their role as a broader one, comprising the country’s defence, development and sovereignty. But many of them also regard the Maduro government’s economic mismanagement as the antithesis of this mission. These officers are alarmed by recent surveys showing the armed forces’ popularity plummeting, with over 85 per cent rating the institution unfavourably.

Instead, most of the armed forces appear to have retained a conservative outlook in favour of the status quo, preferring to avoid the risks of armed intervention in national political life not merely because of the dangers to themselves but also out of awareness that the six coups since the end of the last military dictatorship have all failed. Discontented soldiers “do not become partisan opposition followers”, noted the former officer.

Several low-ranking officers consulted by Crisis Group observed that Defence Minister Padrino López was clearly committed to chavismo and personally loyal to Maduro, but that he also respected the constitution and defended the armed forces’ institutional roles against efforts to turn the military into a protagonist in Venezuela’s political battles. One example is his reported insistence in 2015 that the results of the legislative elections, which the government lost, were respected. Padrino López has held the position for five years, longer than anyone else since Chávez rose to power. His ability to manage the military’s internal workings and the mounting demands upon it reinforces his perceived legitimacy. After defecting in April, Cristopher Figuera wrote a letter to Padrino López acknowledging the general’s leadership but urging him to serve “the path of reconstruction of the country”.

Roberto Lobo, “Sebastiana Barráez: Maduro ordenó ejercicios militares sin la presencia del ministro de la defensa Padrino López”, PuntodeCorte, 4 September 2019.

The U.S., once one of Venezuela’s main sources of military equipment, prohibited all commercial arms transfers to the country in 2006, arguing that Caracas had failed to cooperate with counter-terrorism efforts. Since the U.S. ban came into force, Russia has become one of Venezuela’s closest military allies, dispensing between $12 and$14 billion in military equipment, including assault rifles, jet fighters, tanks and missile systems, between 2004 and 2012.

A viable agreement for a political transition in Venezuela will in all likelihood need to include detailed provisions of this kind regarding the role of the armed forces in the transition and possibly inside an interim government; a medium-term plan for safeguarding military autonomy and officers’ career prospects; and long-term objectives regarding the transformation of a partisan institution into an apolitical one under strict civilian control.

Reuters 2019 special report on the military

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-military-specialreport/special-report-why-the-military-still-stands-by-venezuelas-beleaguered-president-idUSKCN1TT1O4/

Many lower-ranking soldiers, destitute and desperate like most of Venezuela’s working class, have deserted the military in recent years, joining at least 4 million other fellow emigres seeking a better life elsewhere. But few senior officers have heeded the opposition’s call for rebellion, leaving the armed forces top-heavy, unwieldy and still standing by Maduro.

”The chain of command has been lost,” said Cliver Alcala, a former general who retired in 2013 and now supports the opposition from Colombia. “There is no way to know who is in charge of operations, who is in charge of administration and who is in charge of policy.”

The country’s roughly 150,000 Army, Navy, Air Force and National Guard troops are a fraction of the more than 1 million who make up the U.S. armed forces. Yet Venezuela, with as many as 2,000 admirals and generals, now boasts as much as twice the top brass as the U.S. military – more than 10 times as many flag officers as existed when Chavez became president.

The estimate is according to calculations by former Venezuelan officers and the U.S. military.

Guaido in May told reporters his efforts to convert troops are thwarted by the military’s fragmented structure and intimidation within its ranks. “What is preventing the break?” he asked. “The ability to speak openly, directly with each of the sectors. It has to do with the persecution inside the Socialist Party, inside the armed forces.”

To better understand the pressures and policies keeping the troops in Maduro’s camp, Reuters interviewed dozens of current and former officers, soldiers, military scholars and people familiar with Venezuelan security. In their assessment, the military has evolved into a torpid bureaucracy with few leaders capable of engineering the type of mass mutiny that Maduro’s opponents long for.

The $114 million effort put sizeable sums at the discretion of commanders, giving officers a taste for a new kind of influence. “What Plan Bolivar 2000 taught officers was that real power doesn’t lie in commanding troops, but rather in controlling money,” said one retired general. The general, who served under Chavez and Maduro, spoke on condition of anonymity.

Soon, some of the funds began to disappear.

Miguel Morffe, a retired major, once worked as a captain in the remote northwestern region of La Guajira. He recalls receiving a request from superiors to provide materials for an unspecified schoolhouse. When Morffe told a lieutenant colonel that he didn’t understand where the supplies would be going, the superior told him: “I need those materials for something else."

"The school didn’t exist,” Morffe concluded.

”We’re transforming the armed forces for a war of resistance, for the anti-imperialist popular war, for the integral defense of the nation,” he said at a 2004 National Guard ceremony.

Military leaders soon had to pledge their allegiance to Chavez and his Bolivarian project, not just the nation itself. Despite resistance from some commanders, the ruling party slogan, “Fatherland, Socialism or Death,” began echoing through barracks and across parade grounds.

A “cooperation agreement” forged between Chavez and Fidel Castro years earlier had by now blossomed into an alliance on security matters, according to two former officers. Around 2008, Venezuelan officers say they began noticing Cuban officials working within various parts of the armed forces.

General Antonio Rivero, who the previous five years had managed Venezuela’s civil protection authority, says he returned to military activities that year to find Cuban advisors leading training of soldiers and suggesting operational and administrative changes.

The new president continued naming new flag officers and appointed even more military officials to helm agencies. By 2017, active and former military figures had held as many as half of Maduro’s 32 cabinet posts, according to Citizen Control, a Venezuelan non-profit that studies the armed forces.

https://www.controlciudadano.org/

Listening to old crisis group podcast

Listening to an old “Hold your fire” podcast by crisis group’s Phil Gunson about Venezuela.

Negotiations before elections

The real negotations behind Barbados agreement, he says, were chavista - US in Doha.

• US carrot: If you agree with opposition, we’ll give you relief.
• US interest: Mainly migration, oil/gas only medium/longer term because oil industry such bad shape.
• Maduro interest: Ease economic stress, money to buy votes, also just recognition. Proving that he is the president.

Reasons Machado became popular

Opposition:

• Vente Venezuela originally “kinda small”
• Machado wasn’t part of interim government of Guaido.
• Machado had been banned before. Barbados agreement had clause to establish mechanism to review bans; chavista extended it.

Some sanction relief already expired. How much has sanction relief helped? Helped, but much less than expected.

Particularly public sector employees in dire shape because of minimum wage.