The survival of the González Urrutia candidacy could still face a series of obstacles stemming from Chavismo’s control of the Electoral Council and the country’s judicial apparatus. If this was the case, the opposition could have a backup plan in Enrique Márquez –a former member of UNT and former CNE board member, now a candidate registered with the little-known Centrados party– who seemingly celebrated the González consensus but will remain “for now” in the race. https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2024/04/23/can-gonzalez-urrutia-win-the-venezuelan-presidency/
When the (Barbados) Agreement’s text says it is based on “other applicable legal norms” and promotes the authorization of candidates only if they comply with “established requirements” by “procedures” of Venezuelan law, the alleged guarantees are at the mercy of the legal architecture of Chavismo; of its authoritarian judicial activism, of decisions that are truly political.
Thus, contradictorily, the Barbados Agreement acknowledges the lack of electoral guarantees in Venezuela but treats the current Venezuelan discretionary legal framework as that of a liberal democracy. Its institutions hijacked by warring factions of Chavismo, its repeated use of courts to trample on unfavorable electoral results, become “procedures” and “legal norms.”
And Chavista authoritarian judicial activism isn’t a new tool. For Raúl Sánchez Urribarri, associate dean at La Trobe University in Australia, the Venezuelan Judiciary –and especially the TSJ– “is a key institution in the functioning of the Venezuelan autocracy” which perpetuates authoritarian judicial activism through its “lack of independence” and its “political and ideological commitment to defending the interests of the regime.”
Examples of this abound. When the opposition won the 2015 parliamentary elections with an absolute majority, for example, the TSJ declared the National Assembly in contempt for swearing three lawmakers from Amazons and later stripped all of the Assembly’s powers.
The primaries have had a similar effect. Manuel Rosales, a critic of the primaries and governor of Zulia from Un Nuevo Tiempo, is now openly defending and supporting Machado. Fuerza Vecinal, a “loyal opposition” party, imploded after trying to sabotage the primaries: losing, in the stroke of a pen, eight mayors –including one in east Caracas– and around 60 regional leaders including regional lawmakers and councilors. And, for the first time since 2019, Venezuelans who identify as ‘opposition’ are now the biggest self-identification block according to polls by Delphos.
Therefore, the opposition must not waste this revitalization and its rapid re-consolidation in one pole, which is sweeping away the chances of non-unitary candidates from the “loyal opposition” like Benjamín Rausseo, José Brito and Antonio Ecarri. Instead, the Unitary Platform’s substitute candidate –in the likely case the bans are not lifted and Barbados continues imploding– must harvest the effects unleashed by the primaries and María Corina’s rise while capitalizing on discontent within Chavismo. But Machado’s blessing and approval will be pivotal. If not, fragmentation will follow and the small –and incredibly fragile– window of opportunity that 2024 represents will be gone.
“The Maduro regime is in deep trouble and it knows it reaching into its usual bag of tricks the regime has taken a r of measures to subvert the upcoming presidential election the regime has violated the Barbados agreement when it:
- disqualified key opposition figures from running
- it has harassed arrested and intimidated opposition leaders and activists
- it has tampered with voter registration and manipulated voting procedures to favor Pro regime outcomes
- it has changed the name of 6,000 schools which serve as common common voting places to confuse voters as to where they should go on Election Day
- it retracted its invitation to the European Union to observe the elction election leaving a skeleton crew from The Carter Center as likely the only organization to issue a public report
- and through its control of the National Electoral Council it has changed the rules regarding Witnesses at voting booths in an attempt to ensure a higher percentage of those are left without opposition witnesses.
- approximately 69,000 Venezuelans abroad will be able to exercise their constitutional right to vote the rest of those in Venezuela’s nearly 8 million forced to leave the country will not be able to participate because of Arcane rules and arbitrary registration rules imposed by the regime it is clear that these elections will be far from free and fair and despite it all two things remain as clear as ever the opposition is competing effectively and Maria Kina Machado is a generational political figure she’s arrived at campaign events by evading regime blockades to arrive in multiple cars by motorcycle and my personal favorite by canoe and the rallies are massive throngs of people as far as the eye can see as she travels the country in support of her replacement candidate edmundo Gonzalez urua it seems these days nearly every campaign event is
- believes this might be the chance
- maduro mega-fraud: control cne, tsj, military. many possibilities, very likely. but knowing these tactics. call to international community, reaction is critical. independence day.
- maduro will maybe propose national unity government.
- opposition wins
- government able to execute fraud. > immediate crisis.
- fraud > maduro hangs on.
could pave way to transition
primaries 2.6 mio voted. esequibo referendum > no one went. (true?) later ryan: regime just annouced a number without any paper trail. almost 100% pole watchers even with new rule
FANB: disorganized weak. Migrants: ~5mio migrants can’t vote. election is last day of the fraud.
mega fraude scenario: just a number without paper trail. countries have to be ready:
- sanctions package ready
- no precedence (neither 2013, 2018). there was fraud, but vote counted were the vote registered.
- consequences says jose:
- lose legitimacy, dictator
- usa will react
colombia / brazil: they see it through lens of migration, says david. maduro win will likely create new migration wave, a poll backs it up (around 38min)
russian warship hours after maduro said we wanted to renew talks with the usa.
china: wants to collect debt, maybe not very interested in maduro.
jose “nacho”: too late to postpone, believes maduro has ceded power already. he’d have plenty of means. but he hasn’t done it, so he doesn’t think he can do it.
transition david: new government will start in January. but there could be a crackdown. alex: gain control of the territory, because of armed groups.
usa contact: reopened channel was surprising. alex: sceptical. jose: evidence suggest no danger.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ybtt-1tWaY&ab_channel=CenterforStrategic%26InternationalStudies